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agricultural regions m 6 In those areas, however, the movement may still
continue to have considerable significance, particularly if forthcoming state
and federal efforts to legislate in the interest of farm tenants and share
croppers utilize the techniques and the experience of the homestead laws.12T
POSTPONEMENT OF MATURITY DATES UNDER TRUST
INDENTURES
THE RECENT experience of the United States Radiator Corporation is typical
of one of the many situations in which it becomes expedient for a debtor
corporation to postpone the maturity date of its outstanding obligations. The
Radiator Corporation does a seasonal business requiring the manufacture of
products in advance of the months of heavy demand. Not long ago it at-
tempted to finance this pre-season production by bank loans, but in order
to obtain the necessary credit, it found it necessary to postpone the maturity
date of certain of its outstanding debentures which fall due on February 1,
1938. It therefore proposed a plan whereby the outstanding debentures are
to be exchanged for new bonds, payable on August 1, 1946. While the plan
will probably be accepted by a majority of the debenture holders, non-as-
senters will be able to demand payment on the maturity date with a cor-
responding drain on the company's finances, unless they are prevented from
suing by the terms of the indenture.2
This situation prompts an inquiry as to when a dissenting bondholder3
may be forced, either at the hands of the legislature or by a majority of the
126. It is significant that in the United States most of the recent activity in this
field of the law has taken place in the southern and western states. See Vance, tupra
note 2, at 442.
127. For evidence of concern as to the increase in farm tenancy, see N.Y. Times,
Sept. 24, 1936, p. 24, col 1; id. Nov. 18, 1936, p. 16, col 2; id. Dec. 17, 1936, p. 9,
coL 2. It has been suggested that legislation designed to correct this condition should
include provisions to protect the farmer's property from creditors. See N. Y. Times
Feb. 12, 1937, p. 1, col. 1; id. Feb. 13, 1937, p. 1, col. 1.
1. See United States Radiator Corporation, Plan of Reorganization and Deposit
Agreement (June 1, 1936) 2-3. Similar problems arise when maturity falls in a year
of unfavorable interest rates or business conditions. See circular issued by the Great
Northern Railway Company (dated Jan. 1, 1937), providing for the issuance of General
Mortgage 3 .j% Bonds, Series I.
2. Some indentures provide that only the trustee may bring suit and that he cannot
be forced to do so save upon the demand of a certain percentage of the bondholders.
It seems that such provisions are binding upon dissenters. Allan v. Moline Plow Co.,
14 F. (2d) 912 (C. C.A. 8th, 1926); cf. Gellert v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 3 F.
Supp. 812 (E. D. Pa. 1933).
3. Unless otherwise specified, the discussion herein relating to bonds will be equally
applicable to debentures.
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bondholders, to accede to a postponement of the maturity date in his bond.
Such an inquiry should prove particularly significant in view of the increas-
ing popularity of a new type of trust indenture, which expressly provides
for its release or amendment by the consent of less than all of the bond-
holders.4 There appears to be little case law on the subject, but some basis
for prophecy may be found in the related body of law concerning corporate
charter amendment, where a majority of stockholders is usually given wide
powers to alter the rights and preferences attaching to the individual in-
vestor's shares.5
It seems clear that as to bonds already in existence, neither the legislature
nor less than all of the bondholders can postpone retrospectively the obliga-
tion of the issuer to pay the principal at the time specified in the indenture.
State laws altering the maturity date of existing bonds have been held un-
constitutional on the ground that they impaired the contract between the
bondholder and the corporation, 6 and the same objection would probably
vitiate a law which purported to grant this power to a majority of bond-
holders.7 The police power appears to be the sole basis for sustaining such
legislation,8 but it could be successfully invoked only by convincing the court
that an emergency existed for which the statute was a reasonable remedy.9
This might well prove impossible, for the situations would be few in which
a large proportion of corporations would be in sufficiently bad financial straits
to warrant such legislation.1" The ordinary requirements of contract law
4. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTI-
GATION OF THE WORK, AcrTIVITS, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF Po'rEcrvE AND
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, PART III (1936) 226.
5. Curran, Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters (1934)
32 MrcH. L. REv. 743. Of course this power depends upon the actual provisions of the
charter and the local corporation laws; Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 985.
6. Chicago & I. R. R. v. Pyne, 30 Fed. 86 (C. C. S. D. N.Y. 1887) (attempted
acceleration of maturity date); Randolph v. Middleton, 26 N. J. Eq. 543 (1875);
2 JONES, BONDS AND BOND SECURITIES (4th ed. 1935) § 755.
7. In the stockholder cases, it is usually held that the power of the state to amend
corporate charters includes the power to offer amendments to a majority. See Dodd,
Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (1927) 75 U. or PA.
L. REV. 585, 723, and cases cited at 725, n. 69. Contra: Dow v. Northern R. R., 67
N. H. 1, 36 AtI. 510 (1887) ; see 2 Coox, COR'ORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 501.
8. Private contracts are subject to the exercise of the state's police power. Marcus
Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S.
242 (1922); cf. Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
9. This is true of legislation affecting the rights of stockholders. Treigle v. Acme
Homestead Ass'n, 297 U. S. 189 (1936). Equity courts have at times permitted de-
partures from the terms of trust indentures where strict adherence to them was rendered
impossible by the existence of an emergency. N. J. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lincoln
Mortgage & Title Guaranty Co., 105 N. J. Eq. 557, 148 AtI. 713 (1930).
10. Recourse to the police power might prove more successful if the legislation
involved were confined solely to quasi-public corporations and municipalities. Rocker
v. Cardinal Building & Loan Ass'n, 13 N. J. Misc. 397, 179 Ati. 667 (Sup. Ct. 1935). But
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would undoubtedly defeat the efforts of a majority of bondholders to alter
on their own initiative the maturity date of all the bonds. 1 It is true that
although a charter is said to be a contract between the corporation and all
the stockholders,12 a majority of them may amend it without having reserved
that right, so long as the state consents and the changes can be classified
as incidental to and in furtherance of the original purposes of the corpora-
tion.'3 But it has been held that this rule does not permit m.jority stock-
holders to alter redemption dates of preferred stock, such changes being
regarded as fundamental rather than incidental, and a deprivation of dis-
senting stockholders' vested rights.14 Furthermore, the holdings allowing
incidental changes in charters may be attributed to a judicial policy of facil-
itating a measure of flexibility in corporate management,' 5 and the same
interest might not be regarded as applicable to the postponement of maturity
dates of obligations. One of the primary functions of a charter is to describe
managerial activity, and the stockholders whose contract rights it sets forth
are directly concerned with corporate control; the contract between the cor-
poration and the bondholders, on the other hand, is usually designed to
govern the conduct of corporate affairs only in a limited area, and the
bondholders whose rights it sets out are ordinarily regarded as having only
an indirect interest in and control of corporate management. Hence, while
the alteration of the latter contract might assist the corporation's financial
policy, it seems less appropriate to justify such action as being in the interests
of flexible management than in the case of charter amendment.
If less than all the bondholders attempt to postpone the maturity date of
bonds under a power of amendment which was provided for by statute or
in an indenture before the bonds in question were issued, different considera-
tions become relevant.' 6 The initial problem would be to decide whether the
cf. Baker v. Tulsa Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, Okla. Sup. CL, October 6, 1936. In the case
of muncidpalite , such provisions might well prove the most effective means of rear-
ganization, since it has been held that municipalities cannot seek relief under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 293 U. S. 513
(1936).
11. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Union Trust Co., 156 N. Y. 592, 51 N. F_. 309 (103)
(attempted acceleration of maturity date); Kaleta v. Archer Coal and Material Co.,
5 N. E. (2d) 879 (Ill. App. 1936).
12. 7 FLE'CHER, CYcLoPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PnrvAxn ConronaroNs (rev. ed. 1931)
§3657.
13. Perkins v. Coffin, 84 Conn. 275, 79 At. 1070 (1911); Mower v. Staples, 32
Minn. 284, 20 N. IV. 225 (1884) ; Woodfork v. Union Bank, 43 Tenn. 483 (1&66).
Since a charter is considered a grant of authority by the state, it cannot be amended
without the state's consent. See Dodd, supra note 7, at 58K.
14. Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 155 Ga. 204, 116 S. E. 810 (1923); Star
Publishing Co. v. Ball, 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285 (1922).
15. Curran, .'upra note 5, at 745.
16. It is clear that a provision in an indenture granting to a majority of the bond-
holders certain powers other than that of amendment may be binding on all the bond-
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amendment provision could be construed as authorizing the postponement.
It seems probable that an express provision for the postponement of maturity
dates would be necessary. In the stockholder cases, it has usually been held
that a general power to amend, reserved either by the state1" or in the cor-
porate charter,18 does not authorize such amendments as would constitute
a radical departure from the original objects of the corporation, or which
would deprive dissenting stockholders of "vested" rights. There is no unani-
mity in the decisions as to what is meant by these terms, but in general, the
courts are apparently slow to find fatal objections in amendments which may
be said to relate to the enterprise as a whole, while they -are stricter in
determining the validity of those which affect directly the rights of the in-
dividual stockholder, and with respect to which it is easier to raise the claim
of vested rights.19 While it is impossible to draw a line between these cate-
gories, it appears that the right to redeem preferred stock is a "vested"
right and cannot be postponed under a general power of amendment, since
it is of great concern to the individual and is, as a rule, a minor factor in
the management of the corporation. 20 This conclusion seems the more likely
in that similar rights of the individual stockholder, like the right to have a
sinking fund maintained, 21 or the right to accrued cumulative dividends,
22
have also been considered vested.
But even where the amendment provision could be construed as author-
izing a postponement of maturity dates, an investor would not be held to
have subjected himself to the will of the majority unless he had some notice
of the provision when he purchased his bonds. Actual notice would clearly
be sufficient,23 and if the power of amendment were found in a statute no
further notice to the bondholder would be necessary.24 But where it was
holders. Sage v. Central R. R., 99 U. S. 334 (1878) (power to authorize trustee to
purchase at foreclosure sale).
17. Allen v. White, 103 Neb. 256, 171 N. W. 52 (1919); Pronik v. Spirits Dis-
tributing Co., 58 N. J. Eq. 97, 42 Atl. 586 (1899); Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412,
105 N. W. 1031 (1906).
18. Wright v. Knights of Maccabees, 196 N. Y. 391, 89 N. E. 1078 (1909); see
BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928) 85.
19. See Dodd, Amendment of Corporate Articles under the New Ohio General
Corporation Act (1930) 4 U. OF CiN. L. REv. 129, 160; Comment (1929) 77 U. o1
PA. L. REv. 256, 259-260.
20. Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works, 267 N. W. 815 (Mich. 1936); see Jones,
Redeemable Corporate Securities (1932) 5 So. CALIF. L. REV. 83, at 89. The Sutton
case is particularly significant since the preferred stock was in effect a debt of the
corporation, redemption being mandatory rather than optional.
21. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I. 1929).
22. Keller v. Wilson, Del. Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 1936.
23. Actual notice is sufficient in the stockholder cases. Baldwin v. Miller & Lux,
152 Cal. 454, 92 Pac. 1030 (1907) ; Maddock v. Vorclone Corporation, 17 Del. Ch. 39,
147 At. 255 (1929); see General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co.,
97 N. J. Eq. 214, 224, 127 At. 529, 533 (1925) ; JoNEs, 10c. cit. supra note 20.
24. Cf. Boyette v. Preston Motors Corporation, 206 Ala. 240, 89 So. 746 (1921).
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contained in the indenture, some mention of it might have to be made in
the bond.2 5 An express reference to the actual provision would undoubtedly
fulfill all requirements,2 6 but whether this would be true of a general refer-
ence to the indenture as a whole would apparently depend upon the particular
jurisdiction in question.
27
Aside from the questions of construction and notice, there remains the
possibility that a disgruntled bondholder might seek to enjoin- or set aside
a postponement of a maturity date on the ground that it was either fraudu-
lent or unduly oppressive 28 It has been held in the stockholder cases in-
25. See Stetson, Preparation of Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, Collateral Trusts ard
Debenture Indentures in 1 SomE LEGAL PHrASES oF ComnonA= Fn i ml , R onaAnzA-
TION, AND REGULATION (1917) 16. A stockholder is charged with notice of the charter
and the corporate by-laws, whether or not they are referred to in his stock certificate.
Richardson v. Devine, 193 Mass. 336, 79 N. E. 771 (1907); Nicholson v. Franlin
Brewing Co.. 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N. E. 991 (1910). But there are grounds for a
different rule as to indentures. Indentures are merely private contracts, while a cor-
porate charter, and the by-laws in that they are formed under the charter, are credated
pursuant to statute of which the stockholder is deemed to have notice. Furthermore,
charter provisions must be publicly recorded, whereas normally in the case of trust
indentures, the only notice from public recordation would be that provided if the loan
were secured by a recorded mortgage.
26. Cf. Mitchell v. Madison Avenue Offices, 147 Misc. 149, 263 N. Y. Supp. 442
(City Ct. 1933); 7 FLETmcEm, op. cit. supra note 12, § 3157.
27. Cf. Home Mortgage Co. v. Ramsey, 49 F. (2d) 738, 740 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931)
("reference to which [indenture] is hereby made for a description . . . of the rights
. . . of the holders of the bonds . . ." held sufficient to bind bondholders to terms of
indenture) ; Harvey v. Illinois Power & Light Corp., 3 F. Supp. 489, 490 (E. D.
IlL 1933) (similar reference held sufficient); Cunningham v. Pressed Steel Car Co.,
238 App. Div. 624. 625, 265 N. Y. Supp. 256, 258 (Ist Dep't 1933) ("to which in-
denture reference is hereby made for a statement of the rights of the holders of rold
bonds," held insufficient to bind bondholder); Comments (1935) 33 Mica. L Ray.
604, 1082.
28. The protection which equity affords a minority stockholder against the actons
of an uncontrolled majority is well evidenced by the cases involving statutory merger
and consolidation. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1,
120 Atl. 486 (1923); Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 At. 425
(1928); Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N. Y. Supp. 978 (1st
Dep't 1908); see Comment (1936) 45 YALE L J. 105, at 117. This Comment points
out (at page 119) that it is not always clear whether unfairness alone, in the abzence
of fraud, is a sufficient basis for court action.
Language in Sage Y. Central R. R. Co., 99 U. S. 334, 339, 341 (1878), indicates
a similar attitude as to the power of the majority under an indenture to authorize the
trustee to purchase at the foreclosure sale: "What that agreement [the indenture pro-
vision] was, what purpose it was intended to subserve, against what mischief it was
proposed to guard, and by what mode it was stipulated the object intended should
be accomplished, it is very important to consider. . . . While it [the provision] pre-
vented a small minority of the bondholders from forcing unreasonable and inequitable
concessions from the majority, it did not empower that majority to crush out the rights
of the minority, or subject them to any disadvantage." For a similar viewpoint, see
Ikelheimer v. Consolidated Tobacco Co., 59 Atl. 363 (N. J. Ch. 1904).
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volving charter amendments that a majority occupies a fiduciary relation to
the minority,29 and hence the courts, although unwilling to supervise the
managerial soundness of corporate policy, have granted equitable relief where
it was evident that the proposed amendment was made in bad faith, 0 or
was unfair, as where it would unduly prefer one class of investors to another,81
or unnecessarily destroy the special rights and privileges inhering in a par-
ticular type of security.32 In the case of alteration of maturity dates, the
charge of unfairness might frequently be available, for trust mortgages often
provide for the issuance of several series of bonds, and therefore amendments
with respect to one series might injure its security in any one of several
ways: by a discrimination between bond series of nominally equal rank, or
a postponement of access to the mortgaged property before its waste or dis-
sipation. It seems, moreover, that the action of the majority could be attacked
as being undertaken in bad faith, just as in the stockholder cases, on the
ground of improper motives or conflicting interests, as where, for instance,
the proposed amendment would prove of financial benefit to its proponents
in some other respect than in their capacity as bondholders. 3
Attempts to postpone the maturity date of bonds, as distinguished from
debentures, might involve further problems as to whether the lien securing
the bonds could be extended without infringing the rights of junior lienors.
In the absence of express provision in either mortgage, it is generally held
that a first mortgage may be extended despite the objections of second mort-
gagees, since an extension is regarded as one of the privileges of prior en-
29. Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 488 (1919). Similar require-
ments of good faith are imposed upon a majority of bondholders. Hackettstown Nat.
Bank v. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 Fed. 110 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896).
30. MacArthur v. Port of Havana Docks Co., 247 Fed. 984 (D. Me. 1917) (sale
of assets); General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 97 N. J. Eq.
214, 127 At1. 529 (1925) (conflicting interests).
31. Eagleson v. Pacific Timber Co., 270 Fed. 1008 (D. Del. 1920) ; see MacFarlane
v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 178, 157 Atl. 396, 398 (1928).
32. Boyd v. N. Y., & H. R. R., 220 Fed. 174 (S. D. N. Y. 1915) (threatened
loss of peculiar value of security through proposed merger) ; Outwater v. Public Service
Corp., 103 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 729 (Ch. 1928), aff'd, 104 N. J. Eq. 490, 146 Atl.
916 (1929) (preferred stock made redeemable after three years at will of corporation).
33. Such a situation might arise where the amendment was in aid of a sale of
securities or assets to a corporation in which either the trustee or some of the concur-
ring bondholders were financially interested. Cf. General Investment Co. v. American
Hide & Leather Co., 97 N. J. Eq. 214, 127 AtI. 529 (1925).
Since it is generally held that a majority occupies a fiduciary relation to the minority
[see note 29, su pra], it might be maintained that an arbitrary exercise of their power
would constitute a fraud upon it and would be void as a result. Such a doctrine applies
in cases where the holder of a limited power of appointment (who is termed a trustee
of the forum) seeks to deviate from the donor's directions by an agreement with the
appointee. In re Carroll's Estate, 247 App. Div. 11, 286 N. Y. Supp. 307 (1st Dep't
1936), (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 344.
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cumbrancers to which subsequent lienors are subject.34 But where it is
attempted to extend the first mortgage to secure bonds bearing a higher rate
of interest than the old ones, the lien is probably ineffective to secure the
interest obligation above the old rate3  unless, perhaps, the amount of the
principal obligation is correspondingly reduced so that the total prior charge
against the property is no greater than under the original mortgage. Mfore-
over, if the second mortgage indenture contains an express coienant by the
mortgagor that the discharge of prior liens will not be postponed, the ex-
tension of the first mortgage would certainly constitute a breach of that
covenant maldng available all the remedies afforded by the indenture, and
might conceivably be ineffective to continue the first mortgage lien.a
The chief advantage of granting power to a majority of bondholders to
postpone maturity dates would be to facilitate a voluntary reorganization of
the corporation or to postpone insolvency proceedings in court. A voluntary
reorganization is often desirable in view of the expense, delay and unfavor-
able publicity attending court proceedings,a but is a virtual impossibility in
a bond issue of any size where the unanimous consent of the bondholdeis
is necessary, since there are always those who dissent a a matter of opinion
or as a step in coercing the majority to buy out their claims.P This diffi-
culty is the motivating cause for the provisions now being inserted in in-
dentures, which by contract provide the machinery for reorganization with
the consent of less than all of the bondholders4 0 Thus far, however, there
has been little attempt to provide for postponement of maturity dates by
34. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Louisville Ry., 234 Ky. 802, 29 S. I'l. (2d)
552 (1930).
35. See Barbano v. Central-Hudson Steamboat Co., 47 F. (2d) 160, 162 (C C.A.
2d, 1931); 1 Joxzs, MoRTGAGEs (8th ed. 1928) § 444.
36. Where part of the first mortgage debt has been paid, the interest rate on
bonds that remain may be increased so long as no greater encumbrance is placed uron
the land than that which existed when all of the bonds were still in full force. Campb-.U
v. Texas & N. 0. R. R., 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2,369, at 1183 (C.C. E. D. Te- 1872).
37. Cf. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Louisville Ry., 234 Ky. 802, 810, 29 S. W.
(2d) 552, 556 (1930). For an indenture containing such a provision, see Chicago, Roc.
Island and Pacific Railway to Central Trust Co. of New York, Trustee (Appedix,
dated April 1, 1904) 159.
38. See SECURrrIEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Rzpomr, PART VI, op. ct. sZPra
note 4, at 145.
39. Voluntary reorganizations are in rare instances successful. That of the Boston
and Maine Railroad in 1925 is a notable example.
A corporation may at times avoid a court reorganization by persuading a suficiently
large proportion of its creditors to enter into a composition agreement. Maturity dates
have at times been pistponed by such means. Globe Wernicke Co. v. Siegel Myers
School of Music, 209 Ill. App. 529 (1918); Meyer Mfg. Co. v. Iowa Valley Sugar
Co., 199 Iowa 797, 202 N. W. 570 (1925).
40. SEcuRrriEs AND EXCHANGE CommissioN REmORT, PA=t VI, op. cit. zupra note
4, at 143-145.
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the exercise of such powers.4 1 Indeed, the great majority of those indentures
which contain provisions for amendment expressly exclude any action im-
pairing the obligation of the issuer to pay principal or interest in the man-
ner specified in the bond, 42 the purpose apparently being to provide for
voluntary reorganization by other means, as for example, by altering the
relative preferences of the bonds, authorizing a sale of the corporation's
assets, or releasing its property from the indenture and mortgaging it to
others in return for new loans.4 3 It is somewhat difficult to understand why
maturity dates are expressly made sacrosanct, for the power to postpone
them would undoubtedly prove of considerable value, and to restrict the
power of the majority in this respect would seem hardly consistent with
the authority given it to alter matters of apparently greater importance, such
as those previously suggested. But the ultimate desirability of inserting pro-
visions for the alteration of maturity dates does not depend alone upon
whether this particular form of amendment is more or less advantageous than
others. The whole practice of authorizing a majority to make amendments
should be considered with a view to weighing the benefits of convenience and
efficiency to be gained therefrom against the possibilities of abuse in reor-
ganizations conducted without court supervision. 4
41. This appears to have been done in the indenture under consideration in Campbell
River Timber Co. v. Vierhus, 86 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) (extension of
maturity dates by supplemental indenture held "renewal" of bonds subjecting them to
stamp tax).
42. SECURrrIEs AND EXCHANGE COMIISSION REPORT, PART VI, op. cit. japra note
4, at 137. For a collection of indentures permitting amendments, see id. at 135. The
indenture, Chicago Builders' Co. to National Builders Bank of Chicago, Trustee (dated
April 1, 1936) 76, would apparently permit alteration of interest and of maturity dates.
43. See United States Steel Corporation to United States Trust Company of New
York (dated April 1, 1903) 56; Montana-Dakota Power Company to the Minnesota
Loan and Trust Company and Charles V. Smith (dated April 1, 1926) 79; and in-
dentures cited note 42, supra.
44. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Commi ssioN REPORT, PART VI, Op. Cit. $11pra note
4, at 150. When the reorganization calls for the exchange of securities, court super-
vision may still be found desirable as a means of gaining exemption from the require-
ments of the Securities Act under Section 3(a) (10) of that Act. See Comment (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 1050.
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